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forces v;ill be led and employed according to Soviet
doctrine v/hich calls for offensive operations v;ith
e, deeply echeloned, and numerically superior land
orted by air and sea power. This m:assive enemy threat
requirement that the r:a::imum. num.ber of forces be detect
and destroyed prior to engagi-ng friendly forces.
of enemy forces can be accom.plished v.'ith artillery,
opters, and close air support, if those targets can
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This wori< '-jescribes ana illust-rares ci fnethodoloqy
for apt'errriiriin CTT^r-ano, control, and comrrunications
(C3) renu i r emen t s for remotely oiloted aircraft (RPA).
The effort has b^en restricted to airborne plafforms and
t^e investiaetion of thp follow inn issues! manned versus
unmenne'^ a^rcraf^; unrrannea aircraft as wpanon delivery
olatform; unmanned aircraft as ^^ECOf'J/DE.SIGf';ATinr-j platform;
C3 re'Uiirements ^ o r unmanned aircraft; and unmanned aircraft
system cost effectiveness.
-Marsaw Pac^ forces will be led ann employed accor-jinq to
Soviet ooprational doctrinp which calls for offensive
ooeratioris with hinhly mobile^ aeeolv echeloned, and
numerical Iv surer i or land forces, sunoorted by air and sea
DOwer. This massive enemy threat indicates a requirement
t'^at the maxim LJT nw^te r of forces be .detected, identified,
anri Hestroyeo prior to enqaaina frienqly forces.
Destructio'^ of enemy forces can be accomplished with
artillery, at^acic helicopters, and close air suoport, if
those tarqets can be iqenti^ieo and located with sufficient
accuracy for timely taraetino.
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C rt A P T t R I . I ^. I '^ n n I i c T I M
This ^ork describes ^nn illustrates a fre t hcio 1 oqy
for rie f e rrr i n i nq comrrand/ controlf and communications
(C3) reouir«='nr'ent-s for rpTiotPly oiloted aircraft (f^PA),
The ef'^ort has hpen rpstricten to airhorne olatfor'ns and
the invest! :nation o'^ ''he follow ina issues:
1. ^'anne-'l ver'sus Unmanned Aircraft
P. iJn'T'annea Aircraft as 'ieaoon Delivery Platform
3. Unmanned Aircraft as PECON /DF S I GM A T I O^J Platforii
^. C3 PeiuireTents for Unmanned "ircraft
S. Unmanned Aircraft System Cost Hffectiveness
The initial portion of the article discusses some of
the factors contrihutinn to the current renewed
interes*" in unmanned aircraft as related to future combat
envirof^mentj and the tnreat whic^^ may be involved at the
initiation of hostilities. This is followed by an analysis
of the issues/ a descriotion pf a methodology for
determinino C^ reouirements for unmanned aircraft and
finally by a summary concerninq the issue of system cost
effectiveness.

c H A p r t f*' I [ . r^ ' c^ n^^ni^HD of i!^i/a.i.rif:D aircraft
Ourina the oa^t ^e'-^ v»=ars the term "renfotely
piloted vehicle" (RPV) has been use'l as a descriptor for
unmanned aircraft which hav^ a human operator that
monitors and controls their missions^ Ahile ti^e term
"drone" has hepn used to descrioe unmanned aircraft
^hQse mission^; w<=re prporoora'^me''i. The critical feature is
not whether thesp vehicles '=ir(=f classified as RPV or
drone since such classifications are strictly dependent
on the desired mission tasks? but rather that thev are
unTanned/ ana thus, may cost and ooerate differently than
their manned aircraf*" countprnarts. During the remainder
of this article" the term "unT. anned aircraft" will be used in
a very qeneral way to descrioe bo^'h RPV and drone type
aircraft i^ihich a r i^ ynrranned ana perform either one-way or
two-way missions as ren^otelv piloted aircraft (PPA).
Unlike nuclear '^eacons and intercontinental
ballistic T^issiles (IC^ "' s ) > unmanned aircraft are not a
sudden and drainatic technical nrea'kthroi.jah. They are a
system venose t i Tie has come because of a fortunate
conflu'=>nce of a'^vances in technnlooy which can provide a
new military <^yc;(-Qm capable of matchino the trends of
modern warfare. ^orman Augustine, Under Secretary of the
ApTiy, descrice^j thes'^ trends as a hich rate of
attrition in compat, vast Soviet numerical superiority in
«

weaoons/ ani the critical role of tactical ana technical
Surorise.[11.
i'c n i 1 e t ^ e i ci e ^ (^ ^ a t e 1 e v i s i o n - e a u i o d e M radio-
controllea airclane dates i"ack to 1924 in a Hugo
Gernsceck '^aaa7ine article 12) , the actual first use in
World -r^sr II haT noor results. Technoloov was not
adequate to crovide the oerformancef accuracy/ and
reliaoilitv "^e^ded -^or ari effective ^^P^^.
vietnarn ga'« extensive use of Firebee tart^'^t drones
flyina oreoroorarprpi reconnaissance rrissions. The
oerformance/ roliahiMty/ and survivability of these
drones indicated that the PPA was practical. In the 1^73
AraD -Israeli war, thp i-norovised use of R^ k riennonstrated
a Potential count'=>r to the devastatinc capability of
modern air defense systems. [31.
Ijnmanned aircraft can be assianed a wide variety
of missions. Thos*^ car) be consioered in terms of
mission intent. In the classical manr^er missions may be
viewed as beino either strateaic or tact"ica1 in nature.
In either case toe missions may or may not include or ri nance
delivery.
^'odern technoloay has enabled unmanned aircraft to
perform reconnaissance, taraet designation, attack, and
electronic v^Ja^faro missions. vjhen used for reconnaissance
and attacif missions, target ac auisition, atmospheric
research ani laser designation, the RPA's versatility in
size and performance make ther^ an alternative to

m.^nnel aircra'ft in -nany sii-uations-
There is a rather clear rii\/i<:ion of unmanned aircraft
into t no c^ assent hich p)na low-oerforTiance. Hiqh-
oerfoTTiance ^^ ^ are adaotations or derivatives of present
subsonic and suoersonic air tarqet drones. These ^P ^
can oerforT r»= c cnna i s s anc p f taroet desianatioo/ tarqet
attack, and electronic waf^fare missions which in the oast
have oeen the exclusive loTain of ^"^anned aircraft.
Hioh-oer^or -ranee PPA are a niohly desirable alternative
to "-anned aircraff" when:
1. the ^^cticol situation requires more aircraft than
are available Cor can be afforded) from the manned
aircraft fleet;
2. the orobability of loss of the mission aircraft is
ar^ater than can be accented; ana/ or
3. the mission can he executed by RPA at a lower total
syste-^ cost than by a manned aircraft.
The low-cerformance/ or "mini kPA" is a high
"echnoloov military version of the model airclane. ''^ihile
the ultimate uses of this WPi remain to be
determined, its many oossihilities are excitina and
offer oooortunities to increase the combat effectiveness
of our q round/ naval/ and air force at a very modest
cost. ['-I]. Deoendina uoon mission ana configuration/
10

mini-^PA can crovirie an ahun(3ant» !o«« cost" alternative to
fiyed ani rntary wino aircraft for reconnaissance^
tarqet acTuisi»"ion an-j desianation, an^ electronic
warfare ooerations. in an attacx 'voder as a kaTiikaze
precision aijir<ed 'nunitioof they rnay be use^ to
suDoleT, pnt or roolace ouiriecl hcrbSf air-to-surface and
surface-to-3urfacp Tiissiles/ an J cannon-launcHed
crnjecti IP'S. !51
.
Three funrj^rr. ental factors *^ave helned to focus
the interest no>f seen in tie rossicle military use of the
RPfl :
1. Thp increasina lethality of anti-aircraft defenses.
2. The present level o ^ ai'rcraft and equipment costs.
3. The technoloqical advances of electronic and
avionic equip rent.
Tne PP (\ offers the potential for counteracting
enerr'y orounq-to-air defense systems while reducing




CHAPTER III. -^-.^LYSTS OF T^'t ISSUES
The choices facinn cleci??ion-maker"S concerninq
weaoons systien^s that way helo shane the the roles that
U. S. forces olav in future confrontations are
comolex and critical. "^onardless of the final arsenal
asserrclelf at tr, e tiTe hosfili'-i^s are initiate a, asoects of
COn^niand^ control/ an) cc^rr^unications (C3} will imnact the
total caoadilities c^" th'^ !'. S. forces.
For exaTicle? in Furooe/ choices of this nature rjeoend on
an assess'^ent not only of costs* tut also of the
military caoaoilities o'^ the allies and the ' .i arsaw Pact.
^ssesSTent of alliel cacaniHties is necessary because the
relationshio a-nona ^^l^TO forces in the Central Feqion is
such- that a weai<ness in one sector of the front
could threaten the oefense of the entire front.
A. FIPFPOv-jER FmPFAI [n EUROPE
Firecower and maneuver ar^ two of the essential
elerrents of Toc;ern Ground comhat. Although maneuver brinqs
firepoA<er to oear en enemy taraets/ it is the a
o
plication of
firenower that destroys those tarciets.
Direct fire nrouni forces almost certainly can
deliver more sustained fir^oower and destroy enemy
12

;^ C'T'o rori -f-or-raMons t-o r o e^fectivolv t^an clos? air suooort
fcrcps of orvjal cost. riowev/^r/ arouni forces 1ac< the
cao a rilifv ^^ airro^n^^ firono'«<=r assets to covpp long
''iistances auicxly to mee^" an attack on to carry the f:)att1e
totheenemy,
Fireco--^er assets can alSvO re ne^ined in terxis of
how auic'^'ly they can be brouoht to hear in rho European
Central i^eoion. "Imrrertiat^lv availar^e assets" ari= those
attaci^e^i to active oround ann air forces located in
Central Rurone. "Early reinforce 'nenirs" can he described as
those u round anc' air units that can be sent to the
Central reoion in a few days or a week for exafnole/ allied
ready resprve units in Furocef U. S. tactical air
sduadrons based in the United States^ anri airlifted 'J, S.
q round forces -vhose heavy eauip^ent is stored in ti.jrooe.
"Later reinforcen^entSf" such as ('. S. around forces
travellina by sea^ are those that take weeks to co^nlete
(;he rrove to Eurooe.
The i.'niteT States and its I'i'^TO allies acoear to be at
a numerical disadvantaae in irimediately available ground
force firenower weapons wtipn con^oared to the ''l arsaw Pact.
This anoarent ci is car itv Tay be exaogerated by differences
in the "lualitv, noctrinef rcles/ and organization of
^l -i T and '"i arsa-.^ Pact forces. i'Jh ether tne overall
balance is unfavorable or not , however, ',',arsaw Pact
forces could oossiply oain a sionificant local
advantaoe o^^er '\ATO by rr.assino for an attac'<^ thus
13

creatine: a r pen for auic^ reinforcements,
plt-noijon the Pact's initio) nurnerical aDvantaae seems
to r>e wi'-ie1v accert«fi/ tgctnrs other than nuToers of weapons
in units c=^lso affect the helence of fireoower
c^nabilities he*'wee'-< NATO ana the -A'arsaw Pact. One such
f^ictoi" IS the aualitv of arTS. For exaTiole, not onlv do the
Soviets have "-ore artillery/ fcut several of their
weac'ons have -jr-^af^r ranoes ana rates of fire than ^!4T0
artillery, [nl. On the o^her hand/ almost all t\;MO
artillery in Eurooe is se1f-rrorelled anri has some ar-nor
olatina, -rakina it less vulnerable to enen-y fire than
the hulk of Soviet artillery/ which lac<s crew protection.
Doctrine also affects the ^ir=>cower balance. The
Soviets emphasize conduct i no offensive operations at the
ea'"li°st pcssihle t, o'^ent in the conflict/ and they stress
achievinq fir^ superiority over the enemy, Soviet
doctrine for attainim this superiority errrhasizes mass i no
larae numbers of artiMerv at the hreakthrouah ooint/
conducting e prolonaed» intense artillery barraoe to
oestroy eneTiy stronoooints and disrupt enerry control and
reinforcement/ and then attacking irrmediately with
tanks and mo^'ori^e'^ infantry alona the Path prepared
by the artillery barra qe.[7J. This ooctrine for
artillery fire .^nc the less sophisticated Pact ammunition
maxe it necessary for the Pact to use 1arae amounts of
artillery. These nuns rieliver ^n enor'^ous volume of fire on
lame areas of the battlefield rather than on Particular
la

t 3 r a e t '^ .
^.!ATO doctrinef on t^e other hand> errphasizes
Lisina artill'^rv to a^?^c'< c articular Liattlefield
taroets t'-'at threat^ r, aroun':i forces. Tnp su eerier accuracy
ar\ri letnalitv of i'JATO artillery weaoons is exnected to
oermit these tarqets to h^ destroyed without employing
Df'oloogeof -iisruptive fire over lar'qe areas of the
a t t 1 e f i e 1 J
.
So"^e tyces of weaoons— -especially antitan<
guided rrunitions C'vTG'^''s) acnear particularly suited to
defensive oneraticns/ while other weaDons---especia11y
tani<5---are of^'en reoarded as most effective for
offensive maneuvers. Ttius in assess i no Soviet and ^iATO
firerower caoanilitieSf it Ti^y be misleadino to relv
solely on direct comparisons of their tank-S/ without
considerina that fhe de'^ensive advantages of riATO
antitank missiles may nartially compensate for Soviet
advanta^^es in numr^rs of tanks.
A fourth factor in the firecower balance is
the orianizaticn of fi^eoower assets. The Warsaw
Pact's fireoower assets are organized to attack or
defend in a der-th of two or three ranks or "echelons."
Conseouent"lyf only a Portion of the entire force is
directly enaaoeo with pnemy forces at any one time. '.'jhen
units of the first echelon have t:^ecome ineffective
through compaf losses^ they are reclaced by units from the
second echelon. fh^ second echelons take uc the fight
IS

until tnpVf in turn/ need recl^cen^ent. Units culled bacK
to the rear ire rebuilt anri m .Toe ready to rejoin the
b^^fle. I'his "ijnif reolace'^ent" acoroaci^ cermits i-'Jarsaw
Pact forces to -an Tone in continijous 'j round corrbat while
atterr.otina to Taintain a fairlv hi ah level of
effectiveness.
In contrast, rather than pullina entire units out of
fho li nof riuTO TPcunri forces are eyoected to reolace
CO'T^oe'' losses on an iniivirJual and continuous basis.
ThuSf a sizeable oortion of r>.ATO's assets are
retained in 'nain^enance and \ft ei r reserve stocics.fft].
A fifth important factor affecting the fireoower
balance is ^mobilization ti-ne. Tne imrnediate numerical
balance o^ c^rincioal fireoower assets is unfavorable to
MA TO. 1^ short- n-obilization ti^e would rralce the numerical
balance even t. ore unf^ivoraole/ since the Soviets can denloy
forces over Ian-1 from the Soviet Union faster than
t ho L.'nited Scares can ceolov forces fro"' ' i orth America.
These factors of ouality, weaoons mix,
doctrine, organization and available mobilization time
clearly affect tr^e balance of firepower c aoab i 1 i t i es /
tho'joh it is Difficult to assess their precise impact. It
is clear to the author, however, that conclusions about
NATO fireoower carahilities based on numerical comparisons
of weapons in unifs should be qualifieo to account for
these factors.
Nevertheless, the availability of such extensive
16

Marsa^ P^ct ^ row no force firpoower assets in Eurooe^
esneci^Hv wh<=ri co'jrjleo ^ith fho e'^ohasis of Soviet
frilirarv noctrine on o'f'^ersive operations l^) r should
proTOt concern. This concern is heiahtened by the
possibility that a ^act at-tack on western turooe could
occur 'A(ith very liftio warnino/' coulcj be airrsd at raoidly
ovprwhe^Ttinrq ^lATt) defenses in a shorty very intense
war» an'i couIt ire ronduc''==d initially with forces in
Eastern P'jrooe/ wit^ou^ reinforce^rents. Th^se /Jarsaw
Pact forces oronably ^on] o '^ass aaainst relatively wea<
points in I'j/iTO's defenses and could achieve large
concentrations of force any,-! here along the East- '.*i est
hornier. ThuS/ it is possible that--- whatever the overall
balance if rJAro has little ti^ne to '"obilize/ its firepower
capabilities t, av be inaM equate at the point of attack.
In addition to fir=»oowor balance* it is necessary
to un-*erstand the rol* of the manned aircraft in the
Central turooean scenario before the value of the t^PA
can r^e considered.
B. USE OF ^^ AN MFD AIRCRAFT
Airborne fireoower* with its ability to
concentrate ouic<lv, may partly coT^pensate for
deficiencies in oround force firepower^ dePendina on how
it is or^anizen and applied. It is clear to the author
that the allies an") the Unit-ed States have different
17

grorotictes to the u'?** of airhome firepower, although
it IS di*fiClil^ to say i<'hicr^ acoroacn is more effective.
Current-lv/ the ". ^ro allien ^ ^v e essentially no specialized
attact^ nelicooter forces. They use mwltiTissicn aircraft
for firepower suocort of around troops, while the
United States aoo^ars ^o increasinaly deoend on
special i?e'i ^^ircraft for grouno attack missions.
The Eurooean ^'ttro allii=»s not only lack the number
ani soohisticatec kims of U. S. attack helicopter assets^
but tney also cossinly plan to use the assets they do
have differently. In contrast to the expected U. S.
oractic^ o * attaching some ar n-eTi helicopters to ground force
divisions^ the tu'r ocean allies aooear to orefer to use
the helicootors as a corns reserve force. The iJnited States
would probably use arren helicootf?rs to harass or
delay an attackin.j force or to reinforce a defensive
position from which Tround forces have been transferred to
meet a threat else »/ hero. [t aop«=>ars to tt^e author that the
allies woul") orefer to nolo tneir helicopters in
reserve am commit t-hp-ri only wh^n an enemy breakthrough
could not be stoooed by ground forces. Indeed, some
allies, notably the -British, do not believe in using
a*'taci< helicopters near the forward line of own trooos
(FLOT).flO'. Although the allied approach seems to oe in
keep i no with the S'^all size and lioht armament of their
current nelicooter forces^ it woulo apoear to reduce the
potential effect o^ these forces on the initial battle^
18

wt^ere t^'^ir fir'=>oow'^r -ri^v well be of Greatest va1u^.
Tne allies' close air SLJOoort caoabilities are
rpore extensive tt^-^n their attacl< helicooter capabilities^
tiijr the rationale heninrj their choice of *veaoons is
sirrilar. The United States assets acre a r to the author to
be increasinalv »n^o^asi?inn t-h^ oestruction of individual
tanks '^ith qun and ouiden ^rissile fire froTi slow -flying
aircraft oooratinc f r ony oe^^ind friennlv forces. Ihe allies^
by contrasts 3°eT to have chosen not to invest in
speciali-?ed aircraft tor t'lis :vne of co^nrat; they seeTi to
nrefer to ne ^ y \je r scatterable area-tyoe weaoons at very
hiab snee'-is and lou altitudes at sone distance behind enemy
lines* overflying eneiiy forces and defenses in the
process. In addition, unTike the linitod States* most allies
do not stress tne rolp of the Forward Air Controller in
coofdinatino air strikes with ground force ooerations.
Thus, many ot t "^ e allies laci^ both the nersonnel
and the practice required for close coordination of air
strikes and ground force ooeraficns. /jhat the allies call
"clos« air sucrort," the United States would consider
"battlefield interdiction "---that is, disruptina enemy trooo
movements several kilometers beyond the FH^T, with little
coornination betwe^^n friendly air and around forces.
In practice, tnere are authors who hypothesize that
these doctrinal and procedural differences between the
United States and the f-. ATO allies no not sinnificantly
affect the coniuct of military operations. Despite the
19

aoD^rent oroce'iijr^l -^yfferencesr 'J, S. close air suooort
aircra'ft coulr) croharlv Oe ef'fectively i.j=;ed to
reinforce ^lli^.-i orouo'l +orcPS. Still/ if the United
Stntes >/isned to e'T'oh=»3i7e i^s anility to oroviae this kind
of flexible air suooort to the allies^ it should strive to
hetter coordinate close air suooort orocedures and
doctrine/ in oroer to ensure nnaximum C3 effectiveness of
U . S . S'jono r t .
Like the allies/ "'^e Uniten States is
plannin'; ir^orovements in the cjuality, rather than a draf^iatic
increase in the nutter/ cf its artillery oieces. The U.
S. is oursuinc its objective of increasing the range/
volume of fire/ and le'^helity of its artillery through a
numOer of orooraTS/ T^any of whic^ involve only small
near-term costs. These inclurie fitting lonoer aun tuoes to
existing 155 m.m and eight inch howitzers/
procuring roci<e*"-a3sisted orojectiles for greater range?
•ieveloninc ang orocurinq improved conventional munitions
hot scatter homhlets over wide areas? develocing laser-
auide(2 artillery shells that can accurately strike
tanks ang Other noint taraets/ and de\/e1oning imoroved
artillery-locatini p^Hars and a computerized fire-
supoort coordination capability. Finally as a com clement to
its cannon artillery/ the L^nited States is also
developing the (^ener?! Suooort f^ocket System---a multiple
rocket la u nc*^er capable of deliverina a hiah volume of fire
very racigly. An accelerated develoo-^ent schedule mav make
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tnis svst^i" aviil^rle hv the early l^^'^Os.
The Unitel St^t-es now has an inventory of narrow-
bo<ii e'-'i rnr<pt:- ;ani rngc^ine oiin- a rreo Cobra helicooters
whic^ constitute en inteorel cart of the firepo\r;en of
aWost ail U. S. Arrriv divisions. Their sole Duroose is
deliverina orTn.^nce on t^attlefield targets. These
aircraft are in tended to fly close to the arouncj^ using
^e^rai'^ an-i ve. 7 elation to conceal t'i'=>m frof^ eneny yiew and
attaci^. v.ith the assistance of Scout- helicopters flying
with sirr^ilar tactics* they locate enemy ground force
targets anr! cli'^h fro"n their concealed oositions only long
onouah to fire weapons at the target nefore descending
and rpoving on under cover.
Tro Ar^y is in the Tiids.t of a prc'jra^ to convert
alrrost 7 exist i no Cohira helicopters to carry eioht TO-^
ATG'^'Sf and to procure 30S iaentically equipped new
Cobras, tin. This orooraTi will provide U. 3. forces witn
a hiohly 7iobil<^ antitank capability. v'vith the aadition
of limitei nioht-vision capability, this antitank force
will have an improved caoatrMlitv to finht in darkness.
Tnere are two aliened problems with the Cobra/TOW.
First, as a modified aircraft of the Vietnam era, it is
saio to lack s u fficient arTor protection for a European
battlefielo. Seconrj, oecause the aircraft must emerge from
cover for uo to IS seconds in orcer to visually ouide its
TOi'j missile to the target, it is said to be vulneraole to
enemy detection an -ri destruction. To alleviate those
?1

orocle'Tis, ^^l^ ^ c^^ is ievelonim thp ^n\j anc ^d Attack
»-ielic enter ( '^ '^^ ) r of which 536 ^re to be built between
IQ"! ^nn l^"'?, at => cost o^ SS.*^ '"illion each. The total
cost of tnat oroora"" />-il1 be about >-t.l billion. The
Co^ra/rO.^ will comnle^ent this fleet.
I h Q Aflri will hav^ qrea^'er arr. or crotection and
reriunoant controls to irnorove its chances of surviving if
hit. '' ost i^oortantW, it Aiil] fire the Hellfire laser-
Qui-ieo f^issile/ which follows a laser hearr---directed
on a ^aroet cv a around observer, another aircraft, or by
the ^AH itself--and strii<ps its ene'"v taraet accurately.
;\'hen the enemy taroet is oesianated by a around observer or
another aircraft, tne ^^AH '^ill t^e ahle to fire the
nnissile from a comoletely concealed position, thus
reducinri its Chances of being attacked by the enemy.
Desoite these ad vantages, the A AH is not without
emblems. The around laser gesianators are, of course,
v'.jlneracle to sunriressina fire, ai^d thoy may very well lack
aoeguate time to move into oosition if an attack
comes with littl'a wamina. The Scout helicooters that
designate tar(T<=ts for the "iAH must exnose themselves
durina the entire missile fliaht; lackina armor orotection
or defensive armament, they are as vulnerable to
destruction as the A AH its«=1f. The A AH can, of course,
desicnate taraet-s fo"" its own missiles without the
assistance of Scout ho]icooters, but its resulting
exposure reduces the advantage of the Hellfire missile.
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jf t-ho A A!-! is struct bv one or ("wo bu)lets---'t-he kind of
sr^all-arms t:nre3': to aircraft exoerienced in Vietnam-
--its a^Tcr wou1o c^rotec'" it. The most severe threats
to tne at'^ac'^ nel^con^er in turone a r e r however, the Soviet
radar-directe'j ZSD 25 Tim four-barrel lea anti-aircraft qun^
the SA-7 hano-neM anti-aircraft missile* and SA-H and SA-9
surface-to-air rrissilf^s. The ZSU-?i cielivers a very high
volurre of fire; if the A Ah is struck bv one of its
volleys or one of the anti-aircraft TiissileSf the
helicooter v'ill nrot-ahly Oe oestroyeo.
Close air suonort aircraft constitute a second tyoe
of airoorne firenow-=r assets. The U. S, defines close
air sucnort as the delivery of air weaoons in close
coordination with rj round force TovementSf which imolies the
presence cf a Forward ^- } r Controller for coordination,
/Ihile the 'Jnited States currently nerforms close air suooort
with A-7D ^''tack aircraft* suool'^n-ented by F-4s and all*
weather car^able F-lll fiohf-er-borrber aircraft as neeaed and
available^ the Air Force is introducina an a^rcra^t
desianei solely for close air sucDort---tne A-lo, The A-10
is c^esianed to be a simole rLjqged aircraft with a large
weapons cao^citv ^nd antitank caoability. It carries a
3 rriT, cannon, which fires armor- fMercinq amnunition
at a very hiqn rate, and as many as six ^averick guided
missiles. because of its large size and slow soeed, the
aircraft can dest survive combat by avoidina enemy air
defenses. Its orimary tactic is therefore to fly
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low b?hip-i fri^nolv '^orces^ "ooc^oino uo" only Icna enouQh to
Strike ^r^ p.n^-iy f,^rqot '/vith the oun or a missile. Desoite
soTie vuln'^rooili''ie3f the Aptv ann tne Air Force believe
tnat the ii-in can survive com oat if it uses appropriate
tactics ao'i is assisted hv other aircr.^ft that attack enemy
air Defences.
The ijse of U, S. attack helicopters to supplement
allieii fireno'ver caoarilities would also raise
cooroint^tion ornole'ris. iJ. S. attack helicooters
currently ooerate as an extension of/ and in close
coordination with, oroijnd -^orces. The difficulties of
achievina close coordination between U, S. helicopters and
allien oround forces «ould be exacerbated by the
lanotj^oe ^nd procedural diff'=»rence5 of t^e other NATO
forces.
The orincir^al constraints on the utility of the A-10
in Eurooe ^ re i^s lack of a nioht and adverse-
weather capability', the limited numoer of aircraft
planned for deployment to Fi.irope and a shortade of
aircraft s '^ e 1 ^ "^^ r s laroe enouah to accommodate the A-10.
These constraints become significant when considered in
liaht of the Pact's ability to choose the time and
weather in which to attack. If there were little warning of
attack, i\ATO ^ould need more aerial antitank firepower than
in a lonaer warnina scenario.
The use of U, 5, aircraft- to delay enemy attacks
on allied forces and tn destroy enemy tanks and
2ii

armored veniclips could heln the allies hold their
'lefen'^we oosi'"ions until arounrj force reinforceTients could
he shi+ted froT; othpr <;ectors of the Central Front or
snipoe'i'fro'n tneUnitedStates.
The crincio-=jl disjdvantaoe of this ootion is that»
while mannei aircra**" can sunoleTent ground forces^ they
cannot" sut^stitute for thenn: thev can neither deliver a
sustained volui^e of fir?> equivalent to qrounri forces of
enual cnst nor ^old or ta'<e territory. Those factors make
the kino of close air supoort reinforceTient described
here a temporary rathpr than a lona-term substitute for
around forces.
The analysis of the manned versus unmanned aircraft
issue underscores the previously discussed oroolefns
related to aerial tactical warfare while attempting to
shoA that remotely Piloted aircraft (PP'i) could
oossioly be a desirable alternative to manned aircraft
when the tactical situation requires more aircraft than are
availahl-^ (or can oe afforded) in the manned aircraft
fleet; the orobabili«"y of loss of the mission aircraft and
oilot is nreater tnan can be accented; and/or the
mission can he executed at a lo.^er total sys^ierr cost than by
a manne:! aircraft.
Throuah the years/ manned military aircraft have
steadily orown in co'^clexity and cost. A (rajor factor
contributino to hoth complexity an-^ cost is the need for
provicnno trie pilot with comprehensive information
2S

gn^ oerso'^al cro*:ectioi^. In + ac t , carryina the huTian
operator onboard coTDOwnds the "costs" in that it liT^its the
aircraft's -"aneuv^ranil'itv. Pilots are valuaole
oersorinel. It has hecorne increasingly important on
nfi i 1 i t a r y f econoTiic> anc* political grounds to orotect
their lives and prevent their caot'jre. Even thouah one~way
tactical Tiissions would often be of valuer they are
unassinn;^t->le in er-^s of t^e hi'_ih cos^ of pilot experience/
to sav no rhino o'^ tne value of the hi.jrnan life in our
cultural conrext.
/leaoon svstems can be fully automated so that
once released t h e v perform as programmed, Ho^^ever/
intelligence systems are not perfects and it is rjifficult
to anticipate tho exigencies whic^^ mav be encountered
during a mission. With greater destructive cower comes
greater responsibility for maintainina human control
over the weapon until thp moment of it's final disposition.
The value of '^eaoonry is greatly enhanced bv including
human intellioencein the or>erational system. The use of
f^'-'A alio I"' s the human oce r at or to be in a position to
monitor or assume direct control* yet be removed from the
weapon Platform.
Thinking alcno these lineSf one may ask the
folio.vino riu'^stions: If we must or v^ant to use an air
vehicle* vjhy must we also have a human operator in it? How
much of tne time* Ci.e.f during what fraction of a
combat sortie)/ is the human operator really needed? The
^6

onnoard oilo*: is only nee lied when the ooerator
has tc "s<^p" <50'-net'^ina---disc'^iTin3te and decide.
A Qfowina o rco) er in t ac r \ q ^] ^ ,^ r f a r e ooerafions Cana^
t ^e autnor suspects that analooous ones exist for other
kinds of ooerf^tions) the imoroverrent of accur acv in
ordnance delivery in the face o ^ imorovenents to
enoTv air de^'^nsesr -yhiip dpcre^sinq costs and air-crew
1 osses?
The essence of the solution, i.e., reiucinq the loss of
manned aircraft and crews, is the real-time utilization
of man's inherent caoabilities of discrimination and
decision by means which let the operator stay remote
from the actual firim zona. The RPA should be thought of
as a qui dance and control system. It is a Guidance
capability orovidino for su^stanti^1 real-time tactical
decision- mi a^inq essentially as presently done by pilots in
manned aircraft. fhat is what is meant by "Piloted" in
"WpA." t-:pA can bo two-way or one-way vehicles.
Thev can carry warn pads or only reconnaissance (RFCCE)
or communications n,e ar . Thev are not necessarily drones--
- which may or may not oe remotely controlled^ but are
not remotely oilotei. The RPi is a standoff guidance
svstem. [t provides the capability and the opportunity to
preserve and exploit the operator's unioue real-time
abilities without rc-juirim that the operator be exposed
to the most letf^al environments of tactical aerial
warfare. That is wha<" is meant by "man-in-the-looo."
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In cornr^rison 'with .T^nneri aircraft/ tactica' RPA offer
the followina octenfi.^l adv^ntanes:
1. operate i^uch close'' to t'^e tanqet because
of rer:iuceo si^e ana risxc to the operator;
?• present a smaller taraet to defending
antiaircraft ar^il^erv (iiAA) and
surface-to-air t issi!°3 (SA^'^s);
3. delay w-^aoon release until "hev are very
close to and very sure of the desiren tarqet;
U. do not risk nilot loss.
In General/ the PPA can fine orofitable
aoolication wherever enemy s ^ r defenses can be expected to
exact hiqh loss ''ates; whenever the attacker cannot
afford to miss sr< air point/ whenever the target or target
co'Tiolex does not reTuire a la roe weioht of ordnance
over a larqe -^ r e ^ ' whenever tne hu-nan body cannot tolerate
prescrined rnaneuvers or endure other flight conditions/
and whenever human oiscrimination, judgment/ and decision
must enter the lethal environments of an area defended
by mo'lern anti-air weaoons.[lc^].
C. ANiAL^SIS OF UN^^A\iNED AIRCRAFT AS I'jEAPOM OFLIVEPY PLATFORM
^H

SurviV'3bilitv of fixeo eni rotary- w inn aircraft^ both
as i ni-1 i V i ^Uja 1 mission aircraft ana as essential
oraani national cc^cononts of a rno-'jern intecjratecl air-
arouH'i fof-cef is a critical issue today. For the past
decade the ability of arounn air-defense systems to
shoot down aircr^aft nas be<=n increasing at a areater rate
than has tnp suryival ability of rranned aircraft. Unless
this t-pppo is revercio-:;, tactical air and air-niobile forces
will no lonaef" be able to make a major and slj stained
contrioution to winnina the battle on the qrounc.
As imividual aircraft^ RPA have a higher orobabiHty
of surviving a comoat mission than do laraer^ manned
aircraft. -^11 "obs'=ryab1e sianatures" -radar, infrared/
visualf anci au''a1---are much lower for RPA than for
manned aircraft suitable for tne same tactical
missions. fl^J .
In the case of mini PPA, these signatures, as seen by
the hostile aef'=»nse, approach the vanishing ooint. RPA
oresent a much smaller vulnerable taroet to be hit by an
impact munition or the fragments of a oroximity-fused
munition a major gain in aircraft survivability.
This RPA survivability, if comhineo with very
larae numh-^rs of thpm. , could give the air unit commander
freedom to unaerta<:e missions considered desirable or
essential but too hazai^dous to risk a mannea aircraft. It
is inevitanle th=)t a hi':3n sno sustained attrition
rate will h ^y o :^ negative influence ori the ooerational
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decisions o* th-? co'^'^'^nrior o^ a Tanned aircraft unit.
In an effort" to orese^ve assignee forceSf when the
coTi'ranier Has anv choice on wKic'n taroets to attack
vjith manned aircr=ift» t-nat commander i«Mil1 favor those with
a lower attrition rate even if of lesser value; or
will adoct Tission-expci-jtion modes i>/Hich will reduce
the unit's attrition rate although tne effectiveness of
l-i-ip amission rr :^ ^ suffer.
ir'Jith only a liTited nijT, her of costly and (at least in
the near terr) irreplaceable aircraft and oilotS/
OD«=rationa1 caution /./ill oe a pc^erful factor in a
coTirnander's decisions. The Israelis have already facecd
tnis issuo. Their former Chief of Staff/ Oavid E) az ar
,
has stated that close air suocort has been droDced as an air
mission oecause it- has heco^^e too costly for the results
ac h i eved . [ 1 a] ,
Tactical ut-ilization of WPA could include strike
missions comuct'ed in close sucoort of shir or ground
forces. The taroefs will possioly be «ell known in
position, highly protected and of high value. tie re > the
RP-^ may hecomo tne weapon, by carryino ordnance directly
onto the target, an^i he used to destroy SAM sites,
bridaesr individual shios, factories, ana so forth,
ilt-ematively, the '^PA could be used for delivering
or--)nance with a recovery maneuver so as to decrease the
weapon system cost through re- use/ or serve as a target
desianator for weacons to bo delivered from other
30

aircro^t or other "^PA. In oeneral/ tne taraetinq should
be sufficienflv soerific so that the poroute route ohase
can r^=? rr^nlannpi usinq the latest intelliaence and oerhaos
orodra'Tieo into tne autooilot.
Low altitudp strike fnissions ^av also include the
Droblei^ of findina and 'ie5<"royinq taraets of
oonopt unity. Inter ciic^'ive strike missions may be used to
/^ji^nv n^ove^ent or rest to the ene^^v tnrouah intermittent
strikes a*" staqim arpas/ kev road junctionSf rail
.Tars hailing varis^ and so forth. The intent of such
oeneral harassment missions miqht be to deliver
pronaqanoa leaflets; hioloaical/chemical warfare
we?oons; ct'iaff; jar^mers; to rlace sensors ana/or mines or
other c on V <an t- i o n a 1 ordnance; or simoly to cause
activa'-ion of air defense systems.
RP''^ could oossibly be flown in sequence and/or
formation in such a way as to reveal and deplete the
enemy's defense capability. a second strike force of manned
aircr3*t could nossibly he timed to aonear jijst when the
enemy's resonnsiv^ capability has been temporarily
exhaus*"ed. ^PA mav be used in spoofinq; that iS/ to
simulate a bomber or other tyoe of aircraft through the use
of an appropriate transponder or radar cross-section
reflectors. Used in force* remotely piloted aircraft may
simulate an air umbr'=»lla Over an imaqinary fleet of shios#
thus confusina en-^mv reconnaissance; or fly over enemy
territory in wavs so as to mislead the enemy commancder as to
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t-*". e actual tirection of t^^e att'^^ick.
If tactic 'i1 ^ir ;^nfi ^ir-mobile forces are to carry
out their loctrinal i-issions/ t^e effectiveness of
hostile qrouT^ -to-air defenses must be reducea through
intense^ sus^^ined* 1etha1» and nonlethgl g i p -rje f en se-
suDoressio'^ oceratic^s. ^t the oresent^ the United
States' ori:Tary means are attacks launched frorn nanned
aircraft. Tbi-:; rrission neliberately oits friendly manned
aircraft aoairst th<» ene^y svstem fiesioned to shoot
them down, which historically results in hiqh attrition
rates.
The OPA of'^ers the Dotential o ^ becomino the instrurrent
to challenne ani oossinly defeat !^r\ ODOosinc enemy air
defense syste"^. k^pa coulo be built in large Quantities and
ooeratea in larae numr^ers in the enemy's airspace so as to
force t^^e enemy air defense systems into a higher
level of °lectroTaanetic radiation and shootina. This
could cause an increased expenditure of munitions by the
enemy air oefense units and reveal their positions/ thus
subjecting them to attack.
Such a deliberate and intense confrontation between
RPA and hostile air defenses should quickly reduce the
number and effect'iveness of enemy air defense units and
make the surviving lefenders nun-shy, thus Permitting both
manned ani t-'Pu to execute their other combat missions
with greater freeoom of action, in a more ef'^ective way^
and with lower attrition rates.
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D. AMALVSIS OF ijr;WA".)!\{FD Aif^CRAFT as RE CO^l /DES I Gi J A T I OfJ
PL ATF (jPM
To si.jccessfully defeat the enemy/ the coTimanoer of
to a ay Tust b** able '"o recoanize enery intentions and take
Dositive action ^t the earliest possible tirre. Senior
COTmanders "^UStt
1. see trie battlefield
2. direct the intellioence effort/
3. develoD a conceot of operations/
^. allocate assets/
5. sustain the forces/ and
6. olao anrj execute centralized ooeraticns for
effective C3 that iaiiII interface the acpropriate
battlefield syste^^s.
It is not by coincidence that "seeinq" the battlefield
is listeci first. Only by "seeing" the battlefield to the
deoth necessary to identify and trac-c the moven^ent of the
ene'^^y S'^cond- and tnird-ec^'f^lon forces can the comrranders
oerfor-n the other functiof^s expected of them/ esopcially at
the ri'Tht tine and olace. The reauirerr. ent for the
corr^msnners to "see" the battlefield has resulted in an
increase in the a'oount of information required by the
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c c rr. T. a n n e r ann tne oroanic staf'f.
One of the Taj or re''JLiirereni's for a tactical comn^aod
^nd control (CP) svstem ig the availability of
accurate* real"tirne cositiop information on friendly
oersonnel, ve-iicleSf an-i aircraft. This is especially
true when oof^ratim during the hours of darkness ancj in
thos"^ oart^ of the world that are devoid of oroTiinent
terrain featur-^s. T n o PpA could oossibly orovide a
means of coHectina, t-ransmittino and/or retransmitting
vital information to oroanic sta'^f elements so that data
and information can be orovided to the aocropriate
commander in sufficient time to allow decisions to be
rendered tt^at could sianificantly influence the combat
situation. at some ooint in the future.
PPA Tiay be assioned to surveillance missions to
cover oarticular battlefields or areas of ocean. They may
orovide e.=»rlv warning aoainst land, sea^ or air attacks^
monitor an_l t-pack enemy movements, serve to iaentify any
modification of enemy held terrain throuah use of repetitive
video recordin-d or photography in the visual range*
infrared, ultraviolet/ or combination thereof or through the
use of movina taraet indicatina C'TI) radar. Search
and rescue missions mioht benefit from the use of RPA,
y^e r e r 'f o r examole the ^PA Tight be used to oroo an encoded
transoonder, critical sunoliesr or even to provide uraently
reouired defensive materiels such as ammunition and




Tre \^P !\ ly^y r^rovide unmanned target
acauisifion, reconnaissancef and adjustrnent of artillery
fires» as iNell as taroet designation and dannage
assessment for' i'. and of the line of contact in supoort of
combat ele'^ents. Oecendino on rhe "actical situation and
the nrioriti'PS estahlishea t:y suooortea commanders/ the i^PA
system could h'^ used to enhance t^e delivery of cannon and
general suooort- roc'-^et fires for close sucpcrtf counterfiref
suDPression of enemy air defense (SEALO and area
denial utili/im scatferable mines. In addition the '>^P ^ may
also be used to provide data to division artillery for
the undate durinn or following nuclear exchanges on the
battlefield.
Tne RPA as a reconnaissance and
target acquis it- ion/designation system will cue/ be cued
by r and comolempnt other target acguisitioo/
reconnaissance and surveillance systems^ to include manned
aircraft, Imageryfrom the PPA sensor system should
provide sufMcienr resolution to detect/ classify/
recognize/ and locate hostile field artillery and air
defense weanons (to include those with nuclear delivery
capability)/ wneeled or tracked vehicles/ personnel
comorising olatonn or laroer sized unitS/ structures and
terrain caoabie of containing
.
command postS/ suoply




Soviet excloitation of their own
tec*^. noloaica^ levelconent*; "^as oroduced increasinqly strong
forward nai-fle ^rea surface-to-air defenses anri/ at
the s-ime tiTief strenrjthenecl tf^e nee a for IJ. S. combat
S'jpoort to help offset ti^e massive enemy gpound force
fire cower octential. The enemy tactical air aefense
system, unless countereci, will seriously decrease the
C30-^biIitv of air forC'=>s to orovioe the reouired fire
suDcort to frienoly qrouno forces. Presumably^ the latter
conoitiori is ^ ooal indicative of the enemy's concern for
the effect of tnat fire rower on their own forces. Three
Dossihle responses to permit delivery of fire support in the
face of hiahlv effective/ mobile^ anl proliferated air
defenses ?^ r-^ to e^^olov stanooff weapons to alleviate the
need for oeO'^tra^-ion in orovic^inq aerial fire support;
reduce the air defense effectiveness (decoysr jamming^
harassmen^, etc.)? or destroy the defenses. To
succpssfully deliver weanons aoainst around taraets (by
whatever T'=ans---rra'^ne(j aircraft/ ^^PA, or standoff
missiles)/ it is necessary to accomplish a variety of
supporting functions such as reconnaissance/ surveillance/
target development-, identification, and acquisition, laser
designation for guided weaoonsr fire adjustment/ ang strike
control . [151 .
This diverse set of missions can be satisfied by
a relatively small nu'^ber of functional
capabilities: observation of the s re a or item of
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interest .viti^ an aoorooriate sensor (i. e.r one that
ca^ nrovi'ie "'^e kini on^^ quaH«-y o'f oata reauirecJ ov the
mission )r ie'"en"ination o ^ taraet cosition, and orovision
of a Teans of M'"e control and a'TJust^ent, The benefits
fron^ aonlvin>a the hij man's memory/ reasonina^ and
decision--n3<ina caoacity in these orocesses is clear.
In a t" emo t- i n a to orovid'^ these c aoab i 1 i t i es / there are
a'-ivai^taTes •'o f^e q^ ^ noci in oceratinq from an elevated
clatform close to the ocjective "i r e ^i r with whatever
soecific caoaoilities minht be reouired to accomnHsh
the tas<. fhis means emcloyina ^n aDcrooriate set of
vehicles a^-i ooerational conceots that satisfies the mission
r ecu i re'^en t s witnin ''olerable cost bounds. The
developing imaTe of the tpchnoloaicallv advanced
battlefield --larce numbers of mobile^ hard target elements
that must be locate'^ precisely and struck
accurately combined with the environmental constraints of
ooor weather anri rounh terrain indicat'^ that a low/ slow/
maneLiveraol^ olatform is Dref°rred.[16]. The increasingly
hostile environment over and beyond the PLOT caused by the
qrowina su'*face-to-air defense system effectiveness makes
the use of manned aircra'^t systems in this role extremely
excensive in ooth Personnel losses and dollar cost.
The emnloyment of RPA systems for combat
area surveillance/ taraet acauisition/ ana strike control
aoains*" oattlefield targets such as armor/
artillery/ and around-to-air de'^enses could helo to
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Qff<5et ^h'e serious threat- resultina from the incorporation
of a'-'-v Pinc °ri tPChnoloQv hv the ene'i'y. For these
aooMcations/ tne '^otiv^tion for consiDerinq -^PA
syste'^s derives fron^ the ever-wicjenina qaD between the
fireoower of ^he '"' arsaw Pact arounn forces ana that of
the ^lATO lefenierSf coupleo ^ith the strenqthening
orotective a rou no-to-air shield coverina the Pact armored
assault forces. Conseouently/ in this contexts the
introduction of PPA syster^s should be viewed as a
coTiolement and suoole'^ent to rranned surveillance Ci.e.f
forwarri eir controller) and strike aircraft in a total force
context/ and as a hedqe to cover those situations that will
reouire tne Air Force to orovide vital sijnoortina fires to
around forces/ even t-hou^h the use of conventional rnanned
aircraft .Tiqnt lead to arie\/ous losses.
N'any Tii<^sion fijnctions/ if thev are to be perfor^ied
by unTia'^neT aircra'ft at all, reouire transmission of data
in real- (or near-real-) tire over a data link from the
vehicle to a remote control station. Thus, a new
ootential vulnerability (the data link itself) is
added to the tactical air-around strike system. This
oroblem is one of a consi^eranly oifferent character than
has been facen before by tactical strike force planners and
ooerators. In tnis sense/ the successful operation of
the da fa link is not a militarilv useful end oroduct in
and of itself. Presumally/ however/ a functioning aata link
is a reouisite comooneni- of the PPA system. ThuS/ it would
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sep'^ acorooririto to Teesure the iTioact of the oerfornance of
the riat-3 link fi.-^.f the resultant of the interaction of
the enoiTiy jaf^Tiino effort an J the level of jafn resistance
built into the lin.<) in terms of the extent to which the
aoal of the coT'clete system or force has been f^et. In the
case of a oata link in a target surveillance and
(iesionation RPA, as describeri oreviouslv/ the degradation
due to enemv ja^^n^inn ( o r > converselyf the remedial value of
enhanceo jam rpsT^\:^nce) couM be measured in terms of the
C'^anae in i-ho nijmcer of tarTets rietected and destroyed/ or
the movement in the line of contact" of the ground forces
beinn supcorteJf for examole. The key concectt provide
only enouoh jam resistance to make the enemy's jamming
syste'^ sufficiently complex and costly so that other uses of
his defense budcet appear more attractive.
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Ch^PJf-^ IV. C -^ PF.TiJlgF>>^FNTS FOR U^PANNFp AIRCRAFT
Assessim t-be oerforrriance of =5n unmanned aircraft
C3 system in a x-i^e ranae of combat environments is
difficult. This is <iue > in oart to the fact that there
is no oeneral s/s^'e^'S tne?ry whic^ is directlv aopHcaole
to military commanri-controlf the fact of tne complexity of
the military orqani?aticn/ and the fact that a military
command System must manage in ceacetime and command
in CO ""hat. In addition/ there is the lack of definition
of wHat oiafronts should be included in a
consideration of a "command-control-communications
system" for unmanned aircraft. For example:
should intelliaence sensors t-/e included or just the
information flow produced hv these sensors? ^^uch of
the difficulty arises from the lac< of an anproach to
evaluatino staff or':I^ni^:^^ion and its operation; the
effect of style of ooeration; the role of
command-control in tactical doctrine? and the impact
of military, political and soc'ial traditions. There is
also the proolem of evaluating the contribution which
the c omm and -c c n t r o 1 process in itself makes to the
overall ooeration of military forces. It is an essential
eleT^ent- of military onerations^ just as the loaisticSf
trainino, and weaoons capability are. C ?. also includes the
functioninq of the commander as that individual formulates
ao

decisio'^s wiich will c a^i'^e othpr elements of the military
force to oer-forn- a -^ilit^ry ooer^tion.
To win TioOern wars/ •he co'^n^anrje'* .t^ust be not only a
sounrj military s^^ateoist ano tacticiaof but also part
enaineer, scientistf csycholoqist and loaistician.
Traditionallyf the commander's main focus Has r^een the
eneiTiy. It is becomim imoortant that the commander
direct the sa'^e efforts toward orqa^ic commancj, control*
and communications (C3) systems. The purpose of C3 is to
se^ve the commander. '-'ad'^ uo as it is o* less-than-
oerfect machines* oeoole* warfare communities* and technical
oisciolines* today's C3 reauires the commander's
detailed understanding if it is inaee(i to serve and not
hamper operations.
C3 has Deen a critical ingredient in warfare
since oroanized forces ^irst joined in cattle against
o^'her oraani7ed forces. It soon became apparent that
the side which could command* control* and
communicate most effectively possessed a critical
advantage. In /^orld .•.ars I and II* the great land battles*
some coverina an entire nation* .and naval engaqements
encompassing millions of sduare miles of ocean provided
innum, erable examoles of the increasing importance of C5
and the devastatin'-i effects of its absence. Adding the
dimensions of air and undersea operations to (warfare




N''0'l'=rn techno To TV has oroviled the n-eans for rapia
^nrj spcurp tr-^nsmission of "^assive ouantities of data
an-i co'H'^unicati'ons i'^'^nrTation to ana from as well as within
the battlefieli area. -"s with any new assets modern
technolooical C3 reauires fine tunina to errohasize its
strenath=; and avoi'J oitfalls in its utilization.
4 siTole view of the U. S. defense oosture is that
it involves three necessary functions:
1. Surveillance for the ouroose o * assessina tne
capabilities and status of eneTiy forces;
2. .U. S. forces ability to react aporooriately to
various levels of tnreat/ and
5. Command an-i Control (C2) that integrates the
surveillance and reaction functions and provides
for uni^^ieo de'fense forces.
"iltnouqh there ^ r f^ other asoocts of C2 than this
si mole viev inrficatesf it is safe to conclude that the U.
S. C? caparility deoeni.is significantly on the
availability of infor'^ation. /'lithout vital information
in resconse to a crisis or threat/ the nation would be
unable to defend itself arieouately. Accordingly/ a
major consideration for determinino requirements of
COTimand, control/ and comnnunications (C3) for unmanned
aircraft systems should be to insure that the Essential
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Elen^e'^ts of InforTa'-ion (EtT) necessary for decision
nnaKina are known and are Tade excHcit.
fho t-op-n "o5(^c>ntial f^lenn^nts of infnrrration" is not
ne'A. '^ccoroim to JC S PU'r' 1, "EEI ar» the critical
item's of information regard inq the enemy and the
environTien*' needed by the co^nrancier hy a Darticular time to
relate w^^h other available information and intelligence
in orjer to assist in reachinn a lonical decision, "[17],
This oortion of the ''hesis attemots to relate the
sianificance of EEI to C3 systems and oresent a methodology
to determine C5 EEI for un.-nanned aircraft systems.
The oroblern of determinino who needs what inforrration
and the imolication o'^ determining reouirements for
unmanned ai'r craft C^ is a primary concern. The mechanics of
qe^tino essential inforTetion from one location to
another is a different and significant oroblem. As such/
this oroblern has received an arorooriate amount of
atteni-ion at all echelons of com. m and and will not be
addressed. In carticular this information flow oroblern has
been modeled and studied in after-the-fact
reconstruction and analysis of crisis situations. On the
other handf the oroolem of who needs what information during
neacetime conditions as well as during crisis^ limited war/
General war or nuclear i^ar is one which also demands
attention.
A crereguisite to effective command and control is
the availability of orecise/ accurate/ and timely
a3

infofT-^tion on ,, hicn decisions can pp bcis^d. 'a bat is o^ten
nof evi'i'^'^t in ':jpscri"iim C5 sys^erT'S HoweveTf is what tyoes
O ^ avgilattio inforriation Fi r <^ truly nerrr^ane to what
decisions or wr.^t levels o"^ infornnationf orecision or
tifT'eliness ar? really necessary. This is of oarticular
concern since C3 systeTS are^ by design, information
driven. A3 such, the funciafrental criticis'^s for many
of these C!S descriotions ac'^ rhe assumctions that:
1. the ^le'f^ents of information reauired by the
decision maker a^ e ac>~f echelon of C2 to handle the
particular condition, as well as handle a transition
to another condition, are known, and
2. t^e essential infer 'nation is available within the
requirea tirre fra^rie.
To assume th^ existence of sufficient and
immediately available data for decision making is a common
oi'"fall. In soite- of the fact that soohisticated sensor
systems are in -existence today, there is no guarantee that
the EEI needed for a critical decision are available.
A situation can exis*" in wnich there is absolutely no
essential information available, or, no way of qettina it
within a reasonar)!^ tiT, e frame. A more likely situation,
however, aiven current technoloqy, is one where the
information is available so^ne where in some form, but is not
in^mediately available to the commander.
aa

Tec'^n'^lcoic^l a^Vrinces in sensor and
coTiiTiunications syste'^"'; havf* developed to the ooint where a
cOTH-anj 'decision ma'<-er c ai^ t^e inundated with inconinq facts
and statistics/ so that the 'decision orocess is i^noeded
rati-ier than aideci. Fechnolonv has provided the means for
dev'=>looinr.:i hosts of sensor systems^ each oenerally
capable of contrir-utina some^thinq to the oecision tas< at
hand. Oeterrninino the '^iniTium Lt 1 needed by the
vdecision rra<er eliminates non-essential in'^orniation and
orovioes e means of 'leterminino the critical needs
for new unmanned aircraft sensor/communications systems
develoDTPnts.
One tecnnioue for oeterminina EEl is a logic tree
that starts with a Generic state"^ent of the mission and
the command level chosen. From this statement/ a set of
Minimum Fssential Functional Tasks (''EFTs) must De
develocec that describes tne actions or procedures for
the co'T^manj level and assigned mission. Each r-''F. FT can
then he logically s undivided into more definitive
subtasKs. Ihe process "lust oe continued until a task
element level occurs such that the task reached is limited
to one specific subject which calls for only one specific
act ion.
'.^ihen the ^'EFTs correctly represent the minimum-
functional taskSf and the factor analysis is prooerly
carrien out, the pieces of information may then be
considered Etl. Because FEE are developed from =^:EFTs/ the
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need for care in defininq the '•''EFTs is obvious. If
''•^'EFFs ^re no*" essf^ntiig] to the missioOf the resultinq
factored infer rnation a ill contain irrelevant or
redundant elPTients.
The fectorinq orocess can be viewed as a
ohased develooT-ent. ^. rriniTujm of three phases would be
reouirei to ^ully deve'oo unrranned aircraft EEI.
•-0
'a; ever, th^ methodoloav oronosed t^y this thesis aoes
hevond sif^r::lv nevelocino the EEI. The rrethodology is
extended in order to orovide connectivity to the aescriotion
of other inte'^faces in C3 svstenis. The oronosed ohased
acoroscf^ IS descrit-)ed below:
1. Phase T
The first ohase consists of tai«-ing the subtasks under
eacn "lEFT ^nn essentially asl<-ing tho question, "what is the
fpinin^urr infor-nation required" to answer the subtask. For
broad 3ubtas'<s, tnis would result in a reouirement to
further suboiviie until a soecific Question level or oasic
task elennent is identified. These are in turn factored down
to Dasic i n f o r Tia t i on elements. The end coint for any qiven
factorinn chain is one or more data elements, the EEI.
Factorina all subtasks unrier all "^EFTs woulo result in a
series of factorina chains. Each chain must be develooed
indeoenoently in order to qain insiaht into the requirement
for individual data elements. The factorinq chains must be
^6

review ei^ to ;ieterT, ine commonrilitv in reauirements for the
s -j f" e ' :) a t 3 e t e Ti -3 n f 5 .
2, PHase II
Given the EEIr Phase II is an evaluation of the
ouestions; 1) hqw accurately nnust the EEI be known, 2) How
ti'^ety (fro'n ev<=nt- to comTian^er) should the delivery of
the EEI be and 33 ^-^o '^ often should the EEI be uodated
or revaliiatei ?
3. Phasp III
The third oh^se e^it-ails consideration of how many EEI in
total there mioht- ne qiven in a real world worst-case
mission. This ohase would involve takinq the number of EEI
per force el'^ment* tarnet or event in the actual situation
ant icinated.
a. Phase IV
Phase IV is the initial validation of the factoring
orocess. C'ne way to use and test the EEI is to olace them
in a'^ aoorooriate co'^manrl level involved with major
ooerational exercises or war games. The operational
exercise or war aame trainina should cover all theaters of
operation for all conditions of readiness and states of
a?

t^^nsi^^o^. I^ tne 6EI wpre cievelooed for a cores
coTi'Tiandef*/ fhpn that- coT.Tian'-Jer would he t-he only one who
could '5Pci'J'= -vhat- I'-i formation is needed to accornolish
assioned Tissions. The cor-ps cotirr. ander is the decision
maker in the '«/a'' oaTio exercise and as such must decide what
tt^e Ef[ are
.
(J nee ^-'hases I-IV have been accofrolished from the
lowest command Ipvel to the Tiational Command Authority (NCA)
it is necessary to inteorate and Determine what is common
and what is unioue. The data hases at each level can be
combine n ani ruroed; oroceoureSf standard ooeratinq
orocedures (oOPs)/ stra^'eqips ana doctrine can be developed





A final Phase could be one which would provide for
EEI integration ^ith allied forces in I'^.ATO, This chase
would red u ire additional analysis ana would probably
Generate a new set" of FET based upon new mission
requirements and interfaces.
The entire orocess is not as difficult as it may seem
at fi^s^ Tlance. '-'ost units have some aeneral conceot of
ae

ti^pir oarticulaf" EFI, huf t-hoy rr.gv or niav not use or
voli'^-=ii"e tno EEI. Considerable firre ano effort is soent
on npv/plonim t. on e1s snd war oarnes throughout the
military, or i vat" inriustry, am the acadennic community.
'A' hat woul'i ne needed to systematically determine EEI for
unmanned aircraft is orcrestration. The oromulqation
o ^ service co^oatible guidelines^ coals and objectives
would be necessary. i^roaress ^ould have to be
measure^!. The result of sucn effort could have far
reaching imcHcations for the following:
1. evaluatioo the collection caoabilities suooortinq
the COmTanoepf
?. sizino Auto"-ated In^or-nation Handlinq Systems^
3. orioritizina Information Flow in Caoacity Limited
Communications Cf^annels or -'essaae Centers,
^
. modeling a SDPcific C3 system or systems* and
5. develoompot orooosals for C3 syste^^s and related
s ^^ s t e m s .
If a structured analysis like factorinq was oerformed
tne ability to understand and determine reouirements
for unmanned aircraf*" C3 Systems and oroblems v-zould be
enhanced. Thp information needs of the unmanned
aircraft C3 system would be "^ade explicit and hence suoject
aQ

to Cf'ificiS'r eri iT'Orove'^ent.
An illijstrrition o"^ '"'^e mpthoaolooy is contained
i n ^ c D e n rH X A .
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C^^APTER ^I , Sli^^^'ARY a^'O CONCLUSIG'jS
In co^D-arison with Tannerj aircraft, tactical
refpotelv oiloted aircraft are exoecteo to oro'iuce the
folio win a aovanta^-ies (as oreviously described):
1. a remotely oiloteri aircraft could attack much closer in^
? m wouM oresent much less target area to defending AAA and
5. coul.1 cjolay weaoon release until very close (and very
sure) r
^
. could rieliver ordnance directly to the target/ and
5. would sianificantly reduce arty risk of oi1ot loss.
To ensure a successful ^P ^ orograrr the following
are reau i red
:
1. lowest oossible cost of ownershio,
2. si mole in concent.
3. no hinh-risk t^chnolooy.
Warsaw pact Forces will be led and employed according
to Soviet operational doctrine which calls for
offensive operations with hiahly mobile/ deeply echeloned/
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anrj nuT. eriC'3lly sijoerior land forceSf supoorted ty air ano
sea DCvver. Terrain an-i visit^ilify obstruction (sucn as f oq r
s-r.c'<p, "]ar<ness/ adverse weather/ etc.) will generally
lifnit qround observers to a r ^^nge of 3-5 kilometers beyond
the FLC^T for observation and identification of hostile
forces.
Tnis i^assive enemy threat indicates a requirement that
the maxiiTU'Ti nu'^ber of forces be "ietectedf identified^
ano destroyed prior to engadina friendly forces.
Destruction of enexy forces can be accomplished with
artilleryr attac'< helicootersf and close air support/ if
those taroe^'S can •" e identified and located with sufficient
accuracy for timelv tarqetinq.
The RP^ could helo overcome operational deficiencies
by orovidinn t-he T'^aneuver commander and fire
supoort coorcjinator with real-time combat information/
accurate taroet location, and an observed target
enq
a
cement capability neyond the ground line of
siqht, Scich information will enable more timely
r'=oositionina of forces, <Tore effective utilization of
conventional munitions/ ano provide a means of target
selection and desianation for precision guided munitions
(Pr/'1s) not currently available to the qround forces/ without





'^t the discrpt-ion of tho ground force comnanrter/ the
enerny forces Tiay be treot under ooservaticn utilizing
the ^P'i, t ^K^n under conventional artillery fire^
enaaqed nv TAG ''^ir^ or be desianated for attack oy
PG*-'Sr if so oQuioced.
The RPA svste'T' must contain a jam resistant data link
and communications interface with information systems
for tactical command and fire control.
An RPA system with a real-time data transmission (to
include relav/retrans mission) caoability can overcome
line of siriht and ranae limitations imoosed on ground
sensors in meeting the commander's need for a
reconnaissance and targ<=t acduisition asset.
The PPA can orovide imoroved ooerational effectiveness
by givin::: the ground commanoer an "over the hill" look
am tarnet enqaaement caoaoility not currently
oossessedf hy ma^'erially increasing the real-time
intellinence and combat information gathering
C a D a b i 1 i t v .
RPA systems can significantly decrease nonoroductive
ammunition exoenditures by orovidina target location
and burst correction information that would orovide
sufficient accuracy to allow suocorting artillery to
fire for effect after minimal adjustment.
Interooerahility with ^lATO Air Defense and ti. S, Air
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Oe'fense must be insure ''1 for develooioq RPA systems.
] r e Vie^'na'T' exoerionc*^ f^as been updated by rnore
recent Israeli aonlications of U. S. tactics and
eauicn^ent to "nore d^^nsely deoloyed and moaern defenses in
the '^idnle-East in October of l'^7'5. U. S. superiority in
air crew canabilities and more sochisticated
o*fenso-ori'ent'=d w^aoons a^d tactics are orobably offset to
sore pxt«»nt- by nneater Sovie*" en-ohasis on ground-to-air
defense^ esoeciallv in Central Eurooe. Soviet measures such
as sensor redundancy* freauency/ diversity* mobility*
hardness* emission cont-rol* ann sheer numbers limit the
effects of most forms of defense sucoression. The Soviets
are also e^oected to have superior intelliaence of U, 5.
ai^d TiATO offensive and def'^nsive systems. Combinina the
advantages of tai<inq the initiative and of tiaht security
with aood intelliaence offers the Soviets
ODcortunities for both tactical and tecnnical scjrorise,
'^jhatever doctrines* tactics* and hardware the U. S.
intenos to use for ijefense sucoression in Eurooe will have
to oe develooed and be current in the theater when
hostilities beoin. Commanders can adapt auici<ly to counter
enemy initiatives if training has anticioated the need to
react ouickly to the unexpected. Therefore* if RPA are
to be aoded t-o the oefense arsenal of the United States*
the develooment of these assets should not Dec:? in after
the initiation of hostilities. The decision whether or not
5a

these ^PA will become oart o^ the United States defense
arsenal '^ust oe rr^ae now.
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/\PPe:\'OIX A - C5 PEOI.'IRE;>^tNTS FOR lJl\MA^J^IED AIRCRAFT
The oef^pric elp^-^nts arr^/or functions of a
Tiilit^ry un.-ngnneo r3 system Cat whatever level of
corn<van^) can oe rJevelooed in two ways. [IB], Une is to
focus on the coon i five functions of the "commander^"
(the term " cowman.ie^" representina a sinale person or the
co-^mancier olus staff at anv level of the command
sfrujcture.) ^ ^e second is literaHy to list the activities
that must be accomolished in each of the four major
functions which make uo the comranci-control function---
inflow of information, staff sutjoort/formulation of
decision/issuance of orders, and technical machine
suoport of information orocessina, storaae, and
communication.
Consider the foHowinq list that may be oart of
tne connitiv» functions of the commander ^hen assigned
m i 1 i t a r y m i 3 3 1 o n s .
1. Perception of the mission andt
a) the internal
o roan i ? a t i on ;
well-being of the
h) threats to the organization;
c) capanilities of the organization to act
within the existing environment at each
'"Oment in time,
d) response of the organization (both
expected and actual) to direction aiven.
?. Dec i s i on -m a k i no in an environment bounded by:
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a) ty^e constraints 'r
bJ trail tional resoonse oattems',
c) historical analoai^s to current situation;
d ) o rnan i 2 a r i on a 1 motives and qoa1s/
set forth ine) oerceotion as
const-raints.





b) oraanizational reception capabilities ancj
oa t t e rns ;
c) orqani?ational caoanilities at each point
in t i rne .
The list o^ activities for the najor function list
of iterns oertainina to the aeneric component elements
of unmanned aircraft co'^mand -control are the following:
1 . Inflow of Information
a. State'^ent of requirements for information
(1) to intellinence units
(a) at hiaher levels of command
fb) at units sunordinate to this
level of command
id) to subordinate operational units
r3) to adjacent or coooeratina ooerational
u n i t s
b. Information on own forces
M) stari-js of subordinate combat and
service elements




(5) status of ootential reserves
(4) rpoortinq reQuire'Tients---basiC/ as
TioJifieo by conrbat/crisis situation
fa"! oeriodicitv
( b ) f o r-Tia t
(c) content/tyce and detail of data
n e e i e o
c. Information on the enemy
fl) froiT subo r :j i ^ -3 t e
ocerational units;
i n t e 1 1 i qenc e and
(^1 fron intelligence units of higher
h e adnu a r t e r s
fa) frO'T" all available sensors/sources
Dhotint/ comint/ numintf elint,
r ad i n t
(b) a*" all levelSf command target
sensorsf recce< and surveillance
systems that are survivable/robust
in terms of foreseen combat
envi ronment
(l) recortino on enemy c aoah i 1 i t i es
/
movement* location* communication
security* EC"'1 and radar caoaoilities
(. ^ ) reoortino r egu i r emen t s -- -ba s i c * as
modified bv c omb a t /c r i s i
s
fa) periodicity
fb) content/tyne and detail of data
needed
f c ) format
f5) functions to be performed by total
intel licence process at each command
Ipvel* with sophistication and
completeness 'iepend^nt on size and





( c ) aoa 1 vs i s
( r^) reoortino
M) toconnTiander
(2) to suborcjinate units
C3) to ad
j
acen t /cooce ra t i nq
operational eleTients
(. ^ ) to hiaher headaunrters
CS) security of orocess and outout
2 . Staff Functions in Suooort of Unrnanned Aircraft
Corm^anO-Cont" rol
a. '^iperations
(1) review inco'fiing information---own and
enefpy forces? environment
(. P. ) reoort on current Status
( a ) to coT"^ ande r
Cb) to other staff elements
(c) ov 'direction of comniander, to
hiaher headQuarters to adjacent/
coooeratino units
(5) disse^Tiinate new oroers on aoproval of
COrrimander
b . P I a n n i n q
(1) review incofina information---own and
enemy forces? environment
(2) review current operations to establish
oase for olanninq future onerations
(3) prepare future clans for operations
(a) at the direction of commander
(n) t^y own initiative
(4) review incominq information own and
enemy forces? environment

c . Intel 1 IT once
CI) review incoTino infelHoence information
collation
(5) analysis/estimatina of irrplications of
new inforration
(4) renort oreoaration/briefing
(a) to he coTin^ander
(b) to otHer staff elen-ents
(c) by direction of cornrrander» to
hiaher headquarters and to
^ aajacent/coooerating units
(5) based on reauests from comrnanderf
other staff eleT'entS/ and own
initiative prepare requireTients for
in-^orrration collection
5. CoT-Tiander/Decision-Tiaker
a. Supoorted Py actions
technical services
o^ staff and
(1) on basis of commander's stated
require monts (format* periodicity*
detail of content* manner of
presentation* oresentation aids* etc.)
and staff initiative* keot current on:
(a) intellidence of ene^ny
(b) own force ooerations/caoaoilities
(c) Potential new operations/plans
( ?
)
on own initiative* commander maintains
personal communications with
suDoroinate commander* adjacent
commanders* and higher headquarter
com. manders
b. I n i t i a e activity by ooe r a t i on s /p 1 ann i nq
staffs





((?) olan for subsequent stages of
ooerat i ons
c- Initiate activity by intelliaence staff
Ci) to i'^rrove ooerations
i 2) tooainnewinforTiation
d. Issue orders for change in new ooerations
fl) on basis of orders from higher
h eaaqua r t e r
s
(P.) on own initiative/ but with anoroval
of higher headquarters as reguired
e. Control/T^aintain oversioht of resoonse to
this or^ier
(1) hv regu i remen t s for recorting
(2) by use of reconnaissance by own staff
m e Ti b e r s
' i
. Technical S u o c o r t
a. corri-^unications---adequate functioning of
comnnun i c a t i on s net-work in combat
environment. ixietwork of facilities
connectinn suDJect corrrnano with higher and
subordinate headquarters. Facilities must
be :
fl) a-iequate to foreseen information flow
(2) secure and/or jam resistant
(^) accurate in transmitting information







The above listec items are by no means a complete
analysis and were offered only as an illustration of the
bl

r^et^ortoloav ani a noinr. frnni which "Hp development of
unmanned aircraft C ^ reciuirenents could bp refined after
several iterations o ^ tho phased process. If a structured
analysis is continued usinq the chased approach the
information needs of the RPA C3 system will become




APPENDIX B - ijri-''iA:-irjtO -ilRC^AFf SYSTt^''^ COST EFFECTIVENESS
An excellenf cost eMectivpness study (19] of
potential rerrotely Diloteri aircraft (RPA) missions
yielded the folio wina conclusions: "^'anned aircraft with
unquidea bombs may be acceptable for undefended
taroetSr but res ^.j It in extremely high mission costs and crew
losses for oceration against heavil/ defended targets,
vvith laser-guided bomos/ manned-system cost-effectiveness is
much improved^ but air crew losses due to hioh attrition
of the close-in desionator aircraft may be unacceptable for
heavily defended targets. Use of small/ reusable RPA
taraet desianatgrs to reolace <'he manned designator for
delivery of laser-guided bombs eliminates the low air
crew survivacilitv levels of the manned designator/ and
further reduces mission cost py a factor of four
in strong -defense environments. An exnendable air-
la ijnched WPA desionator has the same effect on air crew
survivability/ but mission cost is a Pout a factor of two
or three higherr even though RPA launch and recovery
field ©Deration are eliminated. An. PPA delivering laser-
guided bombs has t-ho lowest operational cost of all
systems evaluated and performs i^s mission without risk to a
crew/ althouoh fieli coerations are comolicated by
additional co^imand and control launch, and recovery
functions. An alternative to RP ^ is the use of the
stand-off missiles on manned aircraft with mission costs
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fifteen to twentv-five tirres areater than h?PA; there is Sonne
ris< to the air ct-^ais, but it is at the lowest level of all
rr. anneT svsterrs stij-iie'-'^. Stand-off missiles are also
connoet-itive in co'=> t with manned delivery of laser-quided
bomos at hinh defensive attrition levels. KPA delivering
un<ouioed bo'^cs are not coroetitive with mannea aircraft at
low aefensive attrition, nor with RPA with lase^-quided
bombsf hc^'ever, t-i^v pi re ^o'"e cost-effective than Tianned
aircraft with unotii.ien t-. otids above ao attrition level of
0.0035. t?PA '^eliverino stincj-off missiles do not offer any
cost advantage over rranned aircraft delivery syste^^s."
"A small reusable PP^ taroet designator eauipoed with
a laser to mark the taraet is an attractive and
versatile svstem and c ^n be used with a number of
different laser- directed wear^on delivery systems to
orovine low mission costs and insensitivity to
defensive caoanility. Use of a Boeinq T"-!? -tyoe aircraft as
a C'^irrier and nlatform for delivery of Ion q -range laser-
quioed weaoons coer a ting with a PPA target designator offers
a oarticularly versatile and cost-effective svstem."
"In general/ PPA missions will concern strike using
laser desianation and multiole weaoon delivery. To
Derform such missions/ the PPA will be guided bv automatic
means through portions of the scenario with the human
operator servino as a monitor a no providing instructions by
mission nhase with overricie capability for manual control
only as this appears to be reouired by the particularities
ba

©f ^s situat"ion. Missions with other intent will also
cleof=n'3 DHon sicinificant levels of sutomation althouah
^he Dartic'jiar traieof'^ hetween onooard corroutation and
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